Abstract: We argue that decentralization of economic and political power makes a substantial difference in football. We demonstrate, with analyses of 35 European democratic countries over the period , that regional autonomy boosts the competition among clubs from different regions and results in a greater competitive balance of domestic football leagues. This first-moment effect creates an advantage for clubs from decentralized countries in international competitions. Evidence from the first 18 editions of the UEFA Champions League shows that clubs from decentralized countries have a greater chance of winning, or at least playing in the final, than those from centralized countries.
Introduction
Despite the fact that the Premier League is by far the European's richest football league (Deloitte Football Money League, 1997 -2017 In this paper we argue that, apart from money and of course chance, the degree of countries' political and economic decentralization positively increases the likelihood of winning football international trophies. Our argument is that the authority exercised by regional governments over those who live in the regions (i.e., Self-rule in Elazar's terms, 1987) According to the well-established theory of fiscal federalism, a decentralized government structure involves an increased citizen welfare and efficiency in the allocation of resources (Martínez-Vázquez et al. 2017) . Proximity makes information flow more easily and gives more flexibility to match citizens' needs and preferences.
More important for our argument it is that decentralization reduces the concentration of resources in the national capital and opens the door to interregional competition in public choices.
Existing research about the demand for football shows that it provides "people with common interests, loyalties and enthusiasm, thus serving as a way to unite diverse groups within a community against outsiders" (Chen 2007, p. 38) . Fan interest for football is mainly a matter of identification with a club, grounded on a geographic or emotional connection and with a strong basis in the self-identity of the fan (Borland and Mcdonald, 2003) . For example, De Ruyter and Wetzels (2000) found that supporters buying shares from their clubs to provide assistance in times of financial need were not motivated by an economic return but rather by the social norm of reciprocity. Luxembourg, on the other, have been won by clubs from the capital city. Our expectation is that the greater the powers of a regional government and the stronger the identification with the football club, the more incentives regional governments face to support it.
Second, we hypothesize that identifications with football clubs should get stronger as regional policies become more important for individuals' well-being.
Unfortunately, we have not come across any study that measures identifications with football clubs in centralized and decentralized countries or in a given country across a decentralization process. However, there is strong evidence supporting that regional identification increase with decentralization (Martínez-Herrera, 2002 ) and probably identifications with football clubs also do. This argument is in line with the conventional wisdom about how decentralization ought to inspire the creation and growth of regional parties. As explained and shown by Lublin (2012 Lublin ( , 2014 , greater self-rule may well increase incentives toward regional party formation in regional elections as autonomy makes control of regional governments more attractive. A similar point is made by Brancati (2008) when she argues that decentralization encourages regional party growth as it provides opportunities to accrue power and resources at the regional level. If fan interest in clubs from the regions increases as a consequence of decentralization, clubs' economic resources should also increase and regional governments and financial institutions will face stronger incentives to support football clubs.
The second point in our argument is that decentralization does not only affect 
Data and methods
The empirical analysis proceeded in two steps. The first step showed that decentralization increases the competitive balance of domestic football leagues in Europe; the second step examined the extent to which the chance of winning the UEFA Champions League, or at least playing in the final, is affected by the degree of decentralization of political and economic power.
The effect of decentralization on the competitive balance of domestic football leagues is examined through a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis in 35
European countries from 1950 to 2010. The sample includes all European countries for which comparable data on the level of democracy and decentralization and information about football domestic leagues are available. As the popularity of football differs greatly across regions, the focus on European countries allows us to control for popularity of the sport. Our assumption is that the popularity of football is largely similar across countries and over time. We have selected the 1950-2010 period due to the availability of data for Self-rule in the dataset generated by Hoogue et al. (2016) .
Finally, given that the competitive balance of domestic football leagues is affected by the type of political regime (Lago et al. 2016) , only democracies are included in the sample. For those countries which have experienced a transition to democracy after 1950, we have only selected those years in which the country is a democracy. Countries are defined as democratic according to Cheibub et al.'s rules (2010) . 3 See the Appendix for a description of the sample.
As decentralization (i.e., Self-rule) changes over time, the competitive balance of domestic football leagues in our sample of countries has been measured for decades.
There is no unique way to measure dominance in sports league (see Szymanski 2015 or Humphreys and Watanabe, 2012) . The measure used here is based on the Gini under democracy. 4 As can be seen in Table 1 The results are virtually the same if decades with less than 10 years when the country transitioned to democracy are dropped. 5 The Regional Authority Index is a measure of the authority of regional governments across ten dimensions: institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, borrowing autonomy, representation, law making, executive control, fiscal control, borrowing control, and constitutional reform. These ten dimensions constitute two domains of authority: Self-rule, or the authority a regional government exerts within its territory; and Shared-rule, or the authority a regional government or its representatives exerts in the country as a whole. Country scores aggregate scores for each regional tier and individual regional governments in a country (Hoogue et al. 2016). 6 The results do not change appreciably when the geographical area of countries is replaced with (the log of) their population (in thousands).
they are normally weaker than established clubs and as a result our dependent variable, the Gini coefficient, rises.
− Ethnic Fragmentation:
The existence of distinct ethnic groups in a country can encourage the creation of competitive clubs representing those groups. As Duke and Crolley (1996) argue, football may provide an important means of expressing latent nationalism with the gathering of large crowds in the stadium. The most commonly used measure of aggregate social heterogeneity is fractionalization, defined as the probability that two individuals selected at random from a country will be from different ethnic groups. The formula is as follows: 
. 7 The expectation is that fragmentation should increase the competitive balance of domestic leagues.
According to preliminary tests (not shown), both individual and period effects have to be included in the models. However, as the controls are totally or largely time- 
The descriptive statistics of the variables in the two empirical analyses are displayed in Table 1 . The second empirical analysis is focused on how countries, or more specifically 
Results

Decentralization and the competitive balance of domestic football leagues
The loess curve in Figure 2 shows that there is a negative correlation between the competitive balance of domestic football leagues in Europe, captured with the Gini coefficient, and the degree of decentralization, measured with Self-rule. As expected, the more decentralized a country is, the greater the competitive balance. The results of the specifications [1] and [2] are displayed in Table 2 . 9 In the two models, the greater the decentralization in a country, the greater the competitive balance of domestic football leagues. Self-rule is statistically significant at the 0.05 percent level in both models and has the expected negative sign. The coefficient on Self-rule, however, is about three times larger in the model with individual and period effects than in the model with only period effects. An increase of ten points in Self-rule decreases the Gini coefficient in 0.073 in the former and 0.027 in the latter. The only statistically significant control is the number of Clubs (with the expected sign). Finally, the fit of the model with individual and period effects is the highest. The first piece of evidence supporting that decentralization creates a competitive advantage for clubs in the UEFA Champions League is shown in Figure 3 . As can be seen, there are substantial differences in Self-rule between those countries with and without clubs winning at least one UEFA Champions League in the 1992/93-2009/10
period. The mean of Self-rule in the first group of countries (7) is 15.62 and in the second group of countries (22) The results of the regression models are presented in Table 3 . As expected, the four models show that the greater the decentralization in a country, the greater the probability that a club from the country wins or plays the final of the UEFA Champions The effect of Self-rule in the two models with the control is shown in Figure 4 .
In totally centralized countries (i.e., the value of Self-rule is 0), the probability of winning the UEFA Champions League is 2 percent. As decentralization increases, this probability increases in a quadratic way. When Self-rule is 25, the highest value in our sample (i.e., in Germany), the probability of winning the UEFA Champions League is 13 percent. The gap is greater for the second dependent variable. The probability of playing the final is 4 percent for clubs representing totally centralized countries and 23 percent for the most decentralized country in the sample. 
Conclusions
We have argued here that the degree of political and economic decentralization has two important effects on domestic and international football leagues. The greater the authority exercised by regional governments over those who live in the regions (i.e., the greater Self-rule), the greater the competitive balance of domestic football leagues.
Regional autonomy boosts the competition among clubs from different regions, increases fan interest, spreads economic resources outside the capital city and, finally, increases the support received by football clubs from regional governments and financial institutions.
This first-moment effect of decentralization creates an advantage for clubs from decentralized countries in international competitions. All else equal, clubs from the most decentralized country in our sample, Germany, have a much greater chance of winning UEFA Champions League-or at least playing the final-as much as 12 and 19 percent points, respectively, than clubs from the most centralized countries (Iceland or Luxembourg).
